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The  typical  French  listed  company  exhibits  a  concentrated  ownership  structure  with  the 
largest shareholder typically holding more voting rights than cash flow rights. This paper 
studies the acquisitions made by French listed firms over the period 2000 through 2009 and 
investigates  how  such  ownership  characteristics  affect  acquirer  abnormal  returns  and 
acquisition  activity.  Abnormal  returns  around  acquisitions  are  decreasing  as  the  wedge 
between  voting  and  cash  flow  rights  increases.  This  result  suggests  that  controlling 
shareholders  use  corporate  acquisitions  as  a  means  of  extracting  private  benefits  at  the 
expense of minority shareholders. The well-documented valuation discount associated with 
the  divergence  between  voting  and  cash  flow  rights  could  be  explained  by  less  efficient 
acquisitions.  The  paper  also  shows  that  firms  whose  largest  shareholder  holds  significant 
excess control rights are less likely to engage in M&A activity. This last finding raises the 
issue of sample selection bias, which has not been taken into account in earlier studies. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Ownership structure acts as an internal governance mechanism. Large shareholders are 
likely to play an important role in exercising corporate governance as their ownership stakes 
provide  them  with  the  incentives  to  collect  information,  scrutinize  manager  actions  and 
oppose value-destroying decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Recent  studies  emphasize  the  prevalence  of  concentrated  ownership  structures  around  the 
world, this being especially true for East Asia (Claessens et al., 2000) or Continental Europe 
(Faccio  and  Lang,  2002)  but  also  in  the  United  States,  despite  the  conventional  wisdom 
suggesting  that  the  typical  U.S.  public  firm  has  diffuse  ownership  (Holderness,  2009). 
Although being associated with numerous advantages (all shareholders will benefit from the 
monitoring  effort  made  by  a  large  blockholder),  concentrated  ownership  might  generate 
severe agency costs. A controlling shareholder has the power to influence corporate decisions 
and is in a position to enjoy private benefits which, by definition, are not shared with other 
(minority)  shareholders.  These  private  benefits  can  take  numerous  forms:  tunneling  of 
resources  out  of  firms  (Johnson  et  al.,  2000),  nepotism  or  the  prestige  and  social  status 
derived from the control of a well-known company.
1 
When making a corporate decision, the controlling shareholder faces a trade-off between 
(1) private benefits she will solely enjoy and (2) the change in her net wealth induced by the 
evolution of firm value. For instance, the controlling shareholder is likely to give consent to 
an investment with negative present value if the benefits she derives outweigh the incurred 
loss induced by the stock price decrease.  
As  emphasized  by  Bebchuk  et  al.  (2000)  and  Morck  et  al.  (2005),  agency  conflicts 
between large and minority shareholders are magnified when the largest shareholder owns 
control  (i.e.  voting)  rights  which  strongly  exceed  her  fraction  of  the  equity  claims  on  a 
company cash flows. Such a separation of ownership and control can be realized through 
control enhancing mechanisms like pyramids, dual-class shares and cross-holding ties. The 
above mentioned studies demonstrate that controlling owners often lock control over their 
companies through these control enhancing mechanisms. Of all the 464 European companies 
                                                 
1 There is no precise definition of the true nature of private benefits of control. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 
312) evoke the benefits associated with the owner-manager status:  “[…] pecuniary returns but also the utility 
generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments 
of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount of 
charitable contributions, personal relations (“friendship,” “respect,” and so on) with employees, a larger than 
optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends”. 
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analyzed in a study commissioned by the European commission, 44% feature at least one 
control enhancing mechanism (ISS, Sherman and Sterling, ECGI, 2007). 
This raises the question of the costs and subsequent loss of social welfare associated with 
a separation of ownership from control. Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003) empirically 
demonstrate that firm valuation is lower when the control rights of the largest owner strongly 
diverge  from  her  cash-flow  rights.  Confirming  these  results,  Guedhami  and  Misra  (2009) 
show that equity financing is more expensive for firms whose controlling shareholder holds 
excess control rights. These studies support the agency hypothesis that large shareholders 
extract  private  benefits  at  the  expense  of  minority  shareholders.  However,  an  important 
question is (partially) left unanswered in earlier studies: what exactly are the channels through 
which  such  extraction  occurs?  In  other  words,  what  are  the  corporate  decisions  that  a 
controlling shareholder influences in order to advance her own interests?  
In this paper, the focus is on corporate acquisitions. They have long been recognized as 
crucial  events  that  are  potentially  associated  with  the  consumption  of  perks  or  private 
benefits. Owner-managers may be prone to invest excess cash-flows in corporate acquisitions 
that maximize their own utility rather than firm value (Jensen, 1986) and entrench themselves 
(Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1989).  The  consequences  of  (bad)  corporate  acquisitions  are  of 
significant economic importance: Moeller at al. (2005) demonstrate that, over the period 1998 
through  2001,  acquiring-firm  shareholders  lost  around  announcement  12  cents  per  dollar 
spent on acquisition. To the extent that acquisitions of other companies are among the most 
important decisions a firm has to make, one could expect conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders to be extremely severe during acquisition periods. 
The  link  between  ownership  structure  and  corporate  acquisitions  has  received  some 
attention in financial literature. Ben-Amar and  André (2006) study  a sample of Canadian 
bidders  and  observe  a  non  linear  relationship  between  the  largest  shareholder  stake  and 
announcement-period  abnormal  returns;  howewer  they  do  not  find  that  separation  of 
ownership and control has a negative impact. The distinctive feature of my paper is its focus 
on France, a country whose institutional framework and ownership characteristics strongly 
differ  from  those  analyzed  in  earlier  studies.  French  firms  typically  have  a  concentrated 
ownership and a controlling shareholder who holds control rights which exceed her cash-flow 
rights.  In the majority  of the cases, this high  discrepancy comes  from the typical  French 
system  of  double  voting  rights  (Burkart  and  Lee,  2008).  Furthermore,  the  protection  of 
minority investors under French law is weak (La Porta et al., 1998). Thus, there is scope for 
severe conflicts between large and minority shareholders.  4 
 
To carry out my analysis, I collected relevant data pertaining to ownership structure for 
SBF250 firms.
2 Due to changes in the composition of this index, my initial sample contains 
400 unique firms. I then construct a sample of 660 acquisitions that were announced by these 
firms over the decade from 2000 to 2009. An important characteristic of this paper is that it 
relies (1) on an acquisition sample (that is to say a sample of firms which actually announce 
an acquisition) and (2) on a larger sample of listed companies, with only some participating in 
the M&A market as bidders. The 660 acquisitions were in fact initiated by 196 companies, 
which demonstrate that approximately one half of SBF250 companies did not announce a 
takeover bid over a 10-year period. In contrast to earlier studies, my methodology allows me 
to control for a potential selection bias that derives from the fact that the choice of bidding is 
not random. 
I  observe  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  between  excess  control  rights  and 
abnormal  returns  around  acquisition  announcements.  This  result  shows  that  acquisitions 
initiated by firms whose largest shareholder holds excess control rights are detrimental to firm 
value and suggests that corporate acquisitions are a means of private benefits extraction at the 
expense of minority shareholders. I also investigate whether other large shareholders play a 
monitoring role. These blockholders are associated with higher value losses and thus do not 
appear  as  credible  safeguards.  Interestingly,  further  empirical  tests  do  not  validate  the 
hypothesis of collusion between these blockholders and the largest one.  
In  a  second  line  of  analysis,  I  examine  the  acquisition  behavior  of  French  listed 
companies. It clearly appears that entrenched owners are very cautious toward acquisitions. 
One possible explanation is that they fear the dilution of their power that could be induced by 
a  stock-financed  deal.  My  acquisition  sample  is  hence  biased  toward  firms  with  a  lower 
separation of ownership and control. After controlling for sample selection bias, the main 
findings hold. 
Finally,  I  try  to  control  for  endogeneity  issues  that  inevitably  arise  in  corporate 
governance  studies  dedicated  to  the  ownership  –  performance  relationship  (Demsetz  and 
Lehn, 1985). I use the instrumental variables technique, which leads me to propose different 
variables  that  can  influence  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  without  directly 
influencing the performance measured by announcement-period abnormal returns. I discuss 
the relevance of this methodology which confirms previous findings. 
                                                 
2 The SBF250 index is composed of the 250 firms with the largest market capitalizations on the Paris Stock 
Exchange. 5 
 
This  paper  is  related  to  the  literature  that  seeks  to  understand  why  excess  control  is 
associated with a valuation discount.  Masulis et al. (2009) examine a sample of U.S. dual-
class  companies  and  show  that  abnormal  returns  around  acquisition  announcements  are 
decreasing  as  the  insider  control  rights  –  cash  flow  rights  divergence  becomes  larger.            
As  suggested  by  these  authors,  further  international  inquiry  is  needed  in  order  to  extend 
understanding of private benefits extraction through other control enhancing mechanisms that 
are not (or rarely) encountered in the United States. This paper fills that gap by showing that 
voting arrangements at the company level significantly harm firm performance. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence of lower abnormal returns for acquisitions announced by firms controlled 
via pyramid structures, which is consistent with empirical studies (Villalonga and Amit, 2009) 
and theoretical models (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008) that 
provide rationale for pyramidal ownership. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  French 
framework and reviews the literature dedicated to the relationship between ownership and 
acquisitions. Section 3 deals with the methodology, the sample selection and the construction 
of variables that are likely to play a role in explaining acquisition quality and why some firms 
engage in  acquisitions. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical  analysis. Section 5 
reports  results  from  robustness  checks  aimed  at  testing  whether  results  are  still  valid  on 
subsamples, correcting selection bias and controlling for endogeneity. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Background 
 
2.1  The French case 
 
A recent study commissioned by the European commission (ISS, Sherman and Sterling, 
ECGI, 2007) describes the availability of control enhancing mechanisms in Europe. In every 
country, external mechanisms (pyramids and cross-shareholdings) are encountered. In France, 
multiple  voting  shares  (in  a  special  form,  see  below),  non-voting  shares  and  non-voting 
preference shares can be observed. From the sample of French civil law countries (La Porta et 
al., 1998), France is the only one in which these three mechanisms are authorized.  
In the vast majority of French listed companies, the deviation from the one share-one vote 
principle is realized through double voting rights shares (Burkart and Lee, 2008). The charter 
of the firm can authorize double voting rights for registered shares that have been held for a 6 
 
defined number of years (between 2 and 4 years). Officially, such double voting rights are 
aimed at rewarding long-term shareholders. It should be noted that these double voting rights 
are  very  different  from  dual-class  shares  frequently  adopted  by  American  and  Swedish 
companies.
3 The double voting right “belongs” to a registered long-term shareholder but is 
lost as soon as the share is sold to another party. Shares must be held during the specified 
period (for instance 2 years) before obtaining an extra voting right. Contrary to dual-class 
shares, there is only one market price for single and double-voting shares. This mechanism 
has not been taken into account in Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study, hence their ownership 
data  tend  to  underestimate  the  wedge  between  ownership  and  control  in  their  sample  of 
French  listed  companies.  However,  the  use  of  this  control  device  is  far  from  anecdotal: 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2009) report that the double voting mechanism is in force in 68.3% of 
French companies. 
Dual-class  structures  are  rarely  observed  in  French  listed  companies.  As  in  Italy  (see 
Zingales, 1994), the only authorized mechanism consists of non-voting shares (which cannot 
account for more than 25% of existing equities).  
My focus on French companies is also motivated by the specificities of the legal and 
institutional framework. Johnson et al. (2000) document anecdotal evidence of tunneling in a 
French firm. In an attempt to assess the size of private benefits of control, Nenova (2003) 
considers  that  controlling  shareholders  appropriate  27%  of  the  value  of  the  company  in 
France.  La Porta et al. (1998) compute the “antidirector rights index” which is equal to 5 for 
the USA and only 3 for France; Djankov et al. (2008) develop the “anti self-dealing index” 
whose value is 0.65 for the USA and 0.38 for France. From these measures, the level of 
protection afforded to investors in France seems to be weak. As ownership concentration and 
legal  investor  protection  are  often  viewed  as  substitutes  (see  for  instance  Denis  and 
McConnel,  2003),  the  high  ownership  concentration  observed  in  French  firms  is  not 
surprising  (only  14%  of  French  listed  companies  are  widely  held  at  the  20%  threshold 
according to Faccio and Lang, 2002). In this context, Boubaker (2007) find results that are 
consistent with those observed in earlier studies: a high separation of ownership and control is 
associated with lower firm value. 
Some  authors  argue  that  extralegal  institutions  may  discourage  predatory  behavior  by 
controlling shareholders. Dyck and Zingales (2004) claim that product market competition, 
                                                 
3 According to Rydqvist (1996) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), dual-class  structures are encountered in 
approximately 75% of Swedish listed companies. Gompers et al. (2010) show that approximately 8% of the 
firms covered by Compustat exhibit a dual-class structure. 7 
 
public opinion pressure, moral norms, unions and tax enforcement may play an important role 
in curbing private benefits. The question of whether France offers such extra-legal institutions 
arises. Dyck and Zingales (2004) propose six different numerical proxies aimed at capturing 
the quality of extra-legal institutions and France is on the average. Stulz and Williamson 
(2003) consider that religion is a good proxy for cultural norms and show that religions are 
associated with significant differences in shareholders rights. In particular, Catholic countries 
(as France) protect the rights of creditors less well.  
In sum, France is characterized by weak corporate governance at the firm level and by a 
legal  and  institutional  framework  which  does  not  offer  strong  protection  against  minority 
expropriation. Extra-legal institutions do not appear as a credible counterforce. Consequently, 
the  conflict  of  interests  between  controlling  and  minority  shareholders  may  be  extremely 
severe in French listed companies and there may  be scope for private benefits extraction 
through different channels. This paper tests whether corporate acquisitions are one of them. 
 
2.2  Ownership-control discrepancy and acquirer returns 
 
The conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders may be extremely 
severe  during  acquisitions  as  the  former  may  use  the  transaction  as  a  channel  of  private 
benefit extraction at the expense of the latter. Some papers focus on intra-group transactions 
and hence test the tunneling hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, it may be beneficial for 
the ultimate owner of a pyramidal business group to favor intragroup transactions so as to 
transfer wealth to the upper level at the expense of minority shareholders at lower levels. 
Studying  a  sample  of  Indian  companies,  Bertrand  et  al.  (2002)  document  evidence  of 
tunneling. In the Korean framework, Bae et al. (2002) show that an acquisition made by a 
chaebol-affiliated firm is value-destroying but that the controlling shareholder benefits from it 
as an increase of the stock prices of other firms in the business group is observed.  However, 
Buysschaert et al. (2004) and Faccio and Stolin (2006) examine European transactions and do 
not  find  any  evidence  of  disproportional  sharing  of  the  gains  between  controlling  and 
minority shareholders. Their results cast doubt on the existence of resources diversion through 
corporate acquisitions. In another European study focused on the Swedish case, Holmen and 
Knopf (2004) examine a sample of 121 mergers occurring over the years 1985 to 1991. They 
do not document any flagrant expropriation of minority shareholders through deals involving 
companies both controlled by a common shareholder.  8 
 
Recent papers tackle the issue of the relationship between ownership structure and quality 
of the acquisition as measured by abnormal returns around the announcement date. Bigelli 
and Mengoli (2004) construct a sample of 228 acquisitions made by Italian listed companies 
over the  years 1989 to 1996. This sample is well suited as (1) a large number of Italian 
companies exhibit a dual-class structure and (2) acquisitions were realized before the adoption 
of  a  major  corporate  governance  reform  which  strongly  reinforced  the  rights  of  minority 
shareholders.
4 The authors show that cumulative abnormal returns are increasing in the ratio 
of cash-flow rights over voting rights held by the largest shareholders. In other words, the 
quality of the acquisitions is lower when there is a high separation of ownership from control. 
This result tends to validate the hypothesis of private benefits extraction through corporate 
acquisitions.  Using  a  sample  of  410  mergers  and  acquisitions  made  by  U.S.  dual-class 
companies, Masulis et al. (2009) demonstrate that the excess-control rights of the dominant 
owner  negatively  affect  the  acquirer  returns.  This  result  confirms  that  the  separation  of 
ownership and control is an important issue even in countries considered as protective of 
shareholder  rights.  However,  Ben-Amar  and  André  (2006)  examine  a  sample  of  327 
acquisitions made by 232 Canadian firms and do not find that separation of ownership and 
control has a negative impact on performance.  
This  brief  review  of  the  literature  shows  that  there  is  no  clear  relationship  between 
separation of ownership and control and acquisitions’ quality. This paper contributes to this 
debate and provides new evidence from the French case. 
 
2.3  Propensity to engage in acquisitions 
 
Financial literature emphasizes the fact that managers can use corporate acquisitions as 
means of implementing their own agendas (empire building strategies). Large shareholders 
have  strong  incentives  to  scrutinize  manager  actions  and  are  thus  likely  to  prevent  such 
opportunistic behaviors. Burkart et al. (1997) develop a model in which this tight monitoring 
can deter management initiatives and discourage the manager from searching for investment 
projects. Consequently, a negative association between the largest shareholder’s stake and the 
likelihood of becoming a bidder is expected. Such a relationship is empirically observed by 
Amihud and Lev (1981): the average number of acquisitions is higher for manager-controlled 
than for owner-controlled companies. 
                                                 
4 Dyck and Zingales (2004) indeed observe that the amount of private benefits dramatically dropped after the 
adoption of this reform (also known as the Draghi reform). 9 
 
The  sense  of  the  relationship  between  ownership/control  discrepancy  and  bidding 
likelihood is not an obvious issue. A high difference between cash-flow rights and voting-
rights  is  likely  to  induce  suboptimal  behavior  of  the  controlling  owner  who  has  fewer 
incentives  to  exercise  tight  control  over  the  manager’s  decisions.  A  positive  association 
between  the  ownership-control  discrepancy  and  the  number  of  acquisitions  can  hence  be 
expected.  
Moreover, large shareholders have a significant part of their wealth concentrated in their own 
companies and suffer from high exposure to firm-specific risk. Diversifying acquisitions can 
be viewed as means by which ultimate owners reduce the risks associated with firm-specific 
investments (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Claessens et al. (1999) show that a larger divergence 
between control and cash-flow rights is associated with more corporate diversification; they 
conclude that large shareholders use diversification to extract private benefits at the expense 
of minority shareholders. One could hence expect that the propensity to engage in acquisitions 
increases in the amount of the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights. This hypothesis is 
empirically  validated  by  Faccio  and  Masulis  (2005)  who  notice  that  firms  whose  largest 
shareholder holds voting rights in excess of her cash-flow rights are more likely to launch 
takeovers.
5  
However, some theories suggest an opposite relationship. Acquisitions are associated with 
a potential loss of control. A stock payment implies a dilution of the largest owner’s voting 
power  and  the  emergence  of  an  outside  blockholder  if  the  target  is  not  a  widely  held 
company. There is also an indirect dilution threat for cash-financed deals: the funding of a 
cash takeover through debt increases bankruptcy risk and thus the probability of future equity 
issuances  aimed  at  refinancing  this  debt.  Additionally,  Martynova  and  Renneboog  (2009) 
point  out the  fact  that  transactions  classified  as  all  cash-offers  in  fact  often  imply  equity 
financing. Accessing such an equity financing may be especially difficult for a firm whose 
controlling  shareholder  hold  voting  rights  in  excess  of  her  cash  flow  rights:  investors 
anticipating future expropriation can be reluctant to buy company’s newly issued shares.  
An important private benefit that is derived from the control of a corporation is the ability to 
allot  significant  management  positions  or  board  seats  to  friends  (nepotism).  This  issue  is 
especially relevant for family controlled firms. By selecting the CEO from the small pool of 
family heirs, the firm might have a top executive who lacks managerial talent. Consistent with 
this  view,  Pérez-González  (2006)  and  Bennedsen  et  al.  (2007)  find  evidence  of  lower 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that this result is not valid for the sample of European continental bidders (French companies 
represent 19.8% of this sample) as the authors observe an insignificant relationship.  10 
 
operating performance of firms which experienced a family succession. The success of large 
acquisitions  strongly  depends  on  the  managerial  skills  of  those  who  conduct  them,  for 
instance highly-skilled CEOs may have abilities to detect good targets. Lacking sufficient 
skills, heirs CEOs may be less likely to engage in complex acquisitions. In line with this 
argument,  Sraer  and  Thesmar  (2007)  show  that  descendant-managed  family  firms  make 
significantly fewer acquisitions.  
Assuming that a high separation of ownership and control is aimed at protecting the private 
benefits of the largest owner, these arguments suggest a negative association between excess 
control  rights  and  the  propensity  to  engage  in  acquisitions.  Studying  a  sample  of  777 
European companies, Caprio et al. (2010) validate this hypothesis. 
To  sum  up,  the  financial  literature  provides  us  with  mixed  and  opposite  conclusions 
concerning the sense of the relationship between the ownership/control separation and the 
propensity to engage in acquisitions. This paper brings new insights about this controversial 
issue.    
3  Methodology, sample, and variables 
 
3.1  Ownership structure analysis 
 
There is no reliable commercial database dedicated to ownership structures for French 
listed companies. Consequently, I choose to hand collect the data. The main data sources are 
the  Documents  de  Reference    which  can  be  downloaded  from  the  AMF  –  the  French 
equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Comission – website (www.amf-france.org).
6 In 
some situations, it was necessary to gather information directly from the company’s website.  
In  order  to  properly  measure  the  discrepancy  between  ownership  and  control,  I  use  the 
ultimate ownership methodology developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and frequently adopted 
in subsequent studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2009; among others). I 
compute the ownership variables at the 10% threshold. Following Faccio and Lang (2002), 
ultimate voting-rights are defined as the weakest link along the control chain. Appendix A 
illustrates the use of this methodology for GROUPE CASINO, an important French food 
retailer.  
 
                                                 
6 This document is similar to an annual report but contains detailed information such as the bylaws of the 
company, an accurate description of the ownership structure and its evolution over the past 3 years. 11 
 
3.2  Sample of French listed companies 
 
I start with the whole sample of French listed companies that are quoted as components of 
the SBF250 index over the years 2000 to 2008 (415 firms). 15 are excluded, due to missing 
information about ownership structures. SBF250 components represent, on average, 92.5% of 
the whole French market capitalization over the sample period. It is worth mentioning that my 
panel is an unbalanced one to the extent that some firms enter into the sample (due to IPOs for 
instance)  or  exit  from  it  (due  to  delistings  or  takeovers).  Accounting  data  are  from  the 
Worldscope database. I exclude observations with irrelevant or extreme values.
7 It should be 
noted that these exclusions do not change the results.  
My sample of acquisitions (see below) encompasses deals made over the period January 
2000  through  December  2009.  As  acquisitions  in  year  t+1  are  matched  with  ownership 
structures at the end of year t, I need to collect ownership variables for the years 1999 to 
2008.  I  use  a  database  that  was  built  for  another  paper  (see  Belot,  2010)  and  extend  it. 
However, I do not have the data for the year 1999. I consider that ownership data for the year 
2000  are  a  good  proxy  for  those  of  the  year  1999.
8  This  approximation  is  relevant  if 
ownership  structures  are  very  stable  over  time  as  postulated  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999); 
nevertheless some authors argue that a substantial fraction of listed companies exhibit large 
ownership structure changes over a given year (Denis and Sarin, 1999). I test the hypothesis 
of the stability of ownership structure by comparing different ownership variables for the 
years 2001 and 2000. For firms that are continuously traded over these two years, I observe an 
insignificant decrease in the ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest owner equal to 0.15% 
(from 36.17% in 2000 to 36.02% in 2001). The hypothesis of stable ownership thus seems to 
be  acceptable;  however  it  could  easily  be  criticized.  As  a  robustness  check,  I  repeat  my 
empirical analysis by excluding the firms whose 1999 ownership variables are proxied by 
their value in 2000. This does not change the results. 
The following table summarizes the construction of the database.  
   
                                                 
7 Tobin’s Q and asset growth are winsorized at 0.999. I also exclude observations with financial leverage higher 
than 1. Following Faccio and Masulis (2005), I exclude observations with values of M&A ACTIVITY (see 
below) higher than 1. 
8 It should be noted that ownership variables for 1999 have been manually collected for the firms which make an 
acquisition in 2000.  12 
 
Number of unique firms (quoted as component of the SBF250 index)  400 
￿  Potential number of firm-years (10 years from 1999 to 2008)  4,000 
Number of excluded observations (delisting…)  -805 
Observations with unavailable accounting/financial data  -56 
Observations with unavailable ownership data  -61 
Exclusion of outliers  -15 
Final number of observations  3,063 
 
3.3  Acquisition data 
 
This  paper  investigates  the  likelihood  that  a  given  firm  announces  an  acquisition. 
Therefore, I match the database presented above with the SDC database. I extract all the deals 
which meet the following criteria: 
-  The announcement date is between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009. 
-  The acquirer is a French listed company  
-  The  deal  value  reported  in  the  SDC  database  is  5  million  Euros  or  higher.  This 
methodological choice leads to the exclusion of trivial operations. 
-  The bidder is seeking to acquire at least 25% of the target’s shares 
-  The  acquiring  company  owns  less  than  50%  of  the  target’s  shares  prior  to  the 
announcement and seeks to own more than 50% after the transaction. Hence, the focus 
is on deals that imply a real change of control. 
 
The SDC database reports 821 deals which meet these criteria. I exclude deals initiated by 
firms which are not in the SBF250  Index (128),  I then exclude 5 deals because bidder’s 
financial statements for the fiscal year end preceding the announcement are not available in 
Worldscope. Market and share price returns are extracted from Datastream. As part of this 
paper  relies  on  the  event-study  methodology,  a  minimum  of  210  listing  days  before  the 
announcement date is needed. Some observations must be excluded, due to an IPO which is 
too close to the announcement (28 observations). At the end, the final sample contains 660 
observations. 
No restriction is imposed on the bid’s outcome. One could argue that deals referred as 
“completed”  are  more  likely  to  be  associated  with  higher  announcement-period  abnormal 
returns, which could lead to a selection bias. I hence choose to include completed but also 13 
 
unsuccessful and withdrawn deals in my sample (in line with Faccio and Masulis, 2005). As a 
robustness check (see below), I replicate the empirical analysis on the sample of completed 
deal. This does not change the results. 
3.4  Variables 
 
3.4.1  Dependant variables 
In  order  to  capture  the  bidder  announcement  effect,  I  use  the  classical  event-study 
methodology  developed  by  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  and  discussed  by  Brown  and  Warner 
(1980).  The  announcement  effect  is  measured  by  the  market  model  adjusted  stock  return 
around the announcement date.  Following Masulis et al. (2007), the market model parameters 
are estimated over the 200-day period from event day – 210 to event day – 11.  The SBF250 
index  is  used  in  order  to  compute  daily  market  returns.  I  calculate  cumulative  abnormal 
returns  (CARs)  over  the  3-days  period  [a-1,  a+1]  where  a  is  the  announcement  date  as 
reported in the SDC database.  
In  the  empirical  analysis  dedicated  to  the  propensity  to  engage  in  acquisitions,  the 
dependant variable yit (with i indicating the company and t the year) takes the value of one 
whether  the  firm  launches  a  bid  in  year  t+1  and  0  otherwise.  The  total  value  of  deals 
announced in year t+1 divided by firm’s market capitalization at the end of year t is another 
metric taken into account. 
 
3.4.2  Predictor variables: ownership characteristics 
In order to capture the incentive effect induced by a large ownership stake, the ultimate 
cash-flow rights (S1 UCF) of the largest owner are included. Some authors (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990 among others) argue that the relationship between this 
latter variable and firm performance is non linear which leads me to include a squared term 
(S1 UCF^2). In studies dedicated to corporate acquisitions, a non monotonic relationship is 
observed  by  Hubbard  and  Palia  (1995)  who  notice  that  announcement-period  abnormal 
returns are first increasing and then decreasing in insider ownership. 
In order to measure the separation of ownership and control, I use two different measures: 
the first one (WEDGE) is computed as a difference, the second one (WEDGE RATIO) is 
measured  as the ratio of ultimate cash-flow  rights over ultimate voting rights. These two 
measures  are  employed  by  Claessens  et  al.  (2002)  and  Ben-Amar  and  André  (2006) 14 
 
respectively. It should be mentioned that the expected signs of the coefficients are different: if 
the  entrenchment  hypothesis  is  true,  a  negative  (positive)  association  between  WEDGE 
(WEDGE RATIO) and acquisition announcement CARs is expected. I compute a dummy 
variable (HIGH WEDGE) which takes the value of one when the variable WEDGE RATIO is 
inferior to its median value. Thus, this variable takes the value of one when the separation of 
ownership and control is high. 
An historical pattern of French capitalism is the prevalence of family ownership (Murphy, 
2005). As previous studies demonstrate that family firms are superior performers (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003) and especially better acquirers (Ben-Amar and André, 2006), I control for 
the identity of the controlling shareholder and create a dummy variable (FAMILY) which 
takes the value of one whether the ultimate owner of the company (at the 10% threshold) is an 
individual or a family.  
Laeven and Levine (2008) show that more than one third of Western European companies 
have a second large shareholder. Bloch and Hege (2001) theoretically demonstrate that the 
second shareholder is more likely to provide a monitoring effort when she owns cash-flow 
rights that are close to those of the first shareholder. This proposition is empirically validated 
by Maury and Pajuste (2005). I hence take into account the existence of other shareholders 
with different variables: S2 UVR measures the ultimate voting rights of the second large 
shareholder (if she owns at least 10% of the voting rights) while S234 UVR is computed as 
the sum of ultimate voting rights of all shareholders holding at least 10% of the voting rights.
9 
The aggregate voting rights of all shareholder (except the largest one) owning at least 5% of 
the voting rights (OTHERS) are also calculated. Ben-Amar and André (2006) validate the 
monitoring hypothesis by observing a positive relation between this variable and acquirer 
returns. However, Maury (2006) finds an overall insignificance of the presence of multiple 
blockholders. 
 
3.4.3  Analysis of bidder abnormal returns: control variables 
The industry relatedness of the deal is stored in a dummy variable (DIVER) which takes 
the value of one when the bidder and the target do not have the same 2-digit SIC code. Morck 
et al. (1990) observe lower returns for bidders which launch diversifying acquisitions. 
                                                 
9 In my sample, the maximum number of large shareholders (i.e. holding at least 10% of the voting rights of a 
given company) is equal to 4. 15 
 
I also control for cross-border transactions with a dummy variable (CROSS-BORDER) which 
is equal to one whether target’s and bidder’s nations differ. Using a sample of acquisitions 
made by US firms, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) demonstrate that bidder announcement 
returns are lower for non domestic than for domestic acquisitions.  
The method of payment is stored in a dummy variable (CASH) which takes a value of one 
whether the acquisition is entirely financed with cash or equivalents). Travlos (1987) shows 
that cash-financed deals generate higher announcement abnormal returns.  
A dummy variable (PUBLIC) takes the value of one when the target is a publicly traded 
company: examining a sample of U.S. bidders, Chang (1998) shows that bidder abnormal 
returns are higher when the target is privately held. This result appears to be universal as 
Faccio et al. (2006) observe similar patterns for transactions initiated by European companies.  
The relative size of the deal (REL. SIZE) is taken into account. In the spirit of Faccio and 
Masulis (2005), I compute the ratio of the deal value over the sum of deal value and bidder’s 
market value of equity at the end of the year preceding the announcement of the deal. Moeller 
et al. (2004) observe a positive association between relative size and bidders’ announcement 
abnormal returns but this result seems to be largely driven by the smallest bidders.  
A measure of recent mergers and acquisitions activity in the target industry (INDUSTRY 
M&A) is computed following Schlingemann et al. (2002). Moeller et al. (2004) document 
lower  abnormal  returns  for  bidders  acquiring  firms  in  the  most  active  mergers  and 
acquisitions markets. The INDUSTRY M&A variable is calculated for the year preceding the 
announcement.  
As an additional control variable, I include a proxy for Tobin’s Q (TOBIN’S Q) and the 
natural logarithm of the book value of assets (LOG(ASSETS)) as Moeller et al. (2004) find 
evidence of negative associations between abnormal returns and these two variables. 
 
3.4.4  Analysis of the propensity to engage in acquisitions: control variables 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) estimate a Probit model to predict bidders. The explanatory 
power of their models is quite high, with McFadden R² values around 20%. I hence choose to 
rely on their methodology and include in my regressions most of their control variables. I 
include Tobin’s Q and the ratio of tangible assets – property, plants and equipments – to total 
assets (PPE/ASS). A positive association between these two variables and the likelihood of 
bidding is expected, as both variables make the financing of the deal easier: property plants 
and  equipments  can  serve  as  collateral  if  additional  borrowing  is  required  while  a  high 16 
 
Tobin’s Q makes acquisition cheaper in case of a stock-financed deal. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) propose a theory of acquisitions based on valuations and show that firms are more 
likely to make stock-financed acquisition when their shares are overvalued.  
Harford (1999) and Miller et al. (2010) respectively find evidence of a positive impact of 
firm growth and firm size on the acquisition likelihood. Assets growth (ASSETS GROWTH) 
and the logarithm of the book value of assets are included as additional control variables.  
One of the main motivations of managers who choose to list abroad is a better access to 
funds  (Bancel  and  Mittoo,  2001)  which  can  be  especially  useful  for  the  financing  of  an 
acquisition. Faccio and Masulis (2005) demonstrate that firms which are cross-listed on either 
the London Stock Exchange or the New-York stock-exchange are more frequent bidders. I 
construct a dummy variable (LISTING USA) which takes the value of one when the firm has 
a listing on a major U.S. stock exchange (Nyse, Amex or Nasdaq). They also show that firms 
classified as belonging to the high tech sector are more likely to become bidders, I hence 
include such a dummy variable (HIGH TECH). As a positive association between takeover 
activity on the firm’s sector and bidding likelihood is also expected, INDUSTRY M&A is 
included as an additional control variable. 
I take into account the debt of the bidding company (LEVERAGE): firms exhibiting a 
high  leverage  may  be  financially  constrained  and  may  find  it  difficult  to  finance  an 
acquisition.  
According to Jensen (1986), the cash holdings of the firm are an important determinant of 
bidding likelihood. I compute the ratio of cash plus tradable securities over total assets as a 
measure of corporate cash-holdings. However, data are sometimes missing and the inclusion 
of this variable reduces the sample size (approximately 10% of the observations are lost). As a 
consequence, this variable is not included in my regressions. It is worth mentioning that the 
inclusion of this variable (when available) does not change the results and that the coefficient 
of this variable is not significant (results available upon request). 
4  Empirical results 
 
4.1  Ownership structure and announcement abnormal returns 
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4.1.1  Descriptive statistics 
Panel  A  of  Table  1  presents  summary  statistics  of  the  acquisitions  sample  by 
announcement year. The average value of the transactions (800 € millions) reported in the 
SDC database is higher than that observed by Masulis et al. (2007). Some firms are very 
frequent acquirers as the table shows that 660 acquisitions were announced by 196 different 
firms. In unreported statistics, I notice that the number of acquisitions over the entire period is 
1 for 70 firms, 2 for 36 firms, 3 for 34 firms and 4 or more for 56 firms.  
Panel B of table 1 describes the characteristics of the bidders and some characteristics of 
the deals. The average ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest owner are equal to 23% while 
her excess control rights are equal to 7.5%. These figures are significantly lower than those 
observed in earlier French studies (Boubaker, 2007). This could be due to widely-held firms: 
they are largely represented in my sample of French bidders (23% of the sample) whereas 
such firms weight approximately 9% of the SBF250 index (Belot, 2010). It is worth noting 
that other blockholders own on average 9.5% of the voting rights, a relatively high stake 
which  could  provide  them  with  the  incentives  to  scrutinize  the  decisions  of  the  largest 
shareholder. The table also confirms the widespread use of double voting rights (in 65% of 
bidding firms) and pyramidal structures (21% of the acquirers). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
In  table  2,  the  focus  is  on  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  the  3-day  period 
surrounding the announcement date (CAR(-1,+1)). The average (median) value is equal to 
0.691% (0.284%) and significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.  I hence do not find 
evidence of short-term  wealth destruction attributable to the acquisitions made by  French 
companies  over  the  sample  period  2000  through  2009.  This  result  is  consistent  with  that 
obtained by Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) who observe positive abnormal returns for a sample 
of Italian bidding firms. In this table, I split the sample according to different characteristics 
of  the  deal.  In  line  with  previous  studies,  I  show  that  transactions  which  induce  a 
diversification  and  those  involving  a  publicly  traded  target  generate  significantly  lower 
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns generated by cash-financed and domestic deals are 
positive and significant, although not being significantly different from those observed for 
cross-border and (at least partially) stock-financed deals.  18 
 
A  sample  split  according  to  ownership  structure  characteristics  reveals  interesting 
patterns: firms whose controlling shareholder holds voting rights which strongly exceed her 
cash-flow rights (HIGH WEDGE=1) earn lower abnormal returns. The difference between the 
two groups of firms is not far from significance (the unreported p-value for the t-test is equal 
to 0.147). This analysis also shows that firms whose charter does not authorize double voting 
rights have higher abnormal returns; interestingly firms whose ultimate owner is an individual 
or a family seem to make better acquisitions (however, the difference between family and 
non-family  firms  is  not  significant).  This  last  result  is  consistent  with  previous  studies 
documenting superior performance of family-controlled companies. 
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4.1.2  Multivariate analysis 
In Table 3, I report the results of regressions which control for different bidder and deal 
characteristics.  The  regressions  tend  to  validate  the  univariate  analysis:  deals  inducing 
corporate  diversification  and  involving  a  publicly  traded  target  generate  lower  abnormal 
returns.  In line with Moeller et al. (2004), my regressions show that acquirer’s Tobin’s Q and 
size have a significant and negative impact on abnormal bidder returns.  
In regression (1) and (2), the separation of ownership and control is measured with the 
difference between ultimate voting and cash-flow rights whereas a ratio is used in regression 
(3). A dummy variable which takes a value of one when the preceding ratio is under its 
median  value  is  included  in  regression  (4).  In  this  last  regression,  the  squared-value  of 
ultimate cash-flow rights is included in order to control for a potential non-linear effect in the 
spirit of Morck et al. (1988). It should be noted that the inclusion of this squared value does 
not modify the results (the coefficient on HIGH WEDGE is negative and significant at the 5% 
threshold if the variable S1 UCF^2 is not included in the regression). 
The  regressions  demonstrate  that  firms  exhibiting  a  high  separation  of  ownership  and 
control earn lower announcement-period abnormal returns. This result supports the hypothesis 
of private benefits extraction through acquisitions. Large shareholders whose interests are not 
perfectly aligned with those of minority shareholders seem to be prone to engage in value 
destroying acquisitions. This result is consistent with that obtained by Bigelli and Mengoli 
(2004) for Italy but is at odds with previous studies: Holmén and Knopf (2004) or Ben-Amar 
and André (2006) do not observe any significant impact of the ownership/control discrepancy 19 
 
on  acquisition  quality.  It  is  a  priori  difficult  to  bring  such  contradictory  findings  back 
together, however the observed differences may be due to different institutional and legal 
frameworks.  Bigelli  and  Mengoli’s  acquiring  firms  are  incorporated  in  Italy,  a  civil-law 
country whose company law was strongly influenced by the French commercial code (La 
Porta et al., 1998) while Holmén and Knopf (Sweden) and Ben-Amar and André (Canada) 
study acquisitions initiated in countries with legal rules that are more protective of minority 
shareholders. 
In regression (5), the impact of control enhancing mechanisms is investigated. Double 
voting rights are associated with significantly lower abnormal returns while pyramids have a 
negative but insignificant influence. This result is in line with that observed by Villalonga and 
Amit (2009) who do not find evidence of pyramidal discount and demonstrate that dual-class 
shares harm firm value. Such findings advocate a mandatory implementation of the one share-
one vote principle and cast doubts on the relevance of double voting rights that are so far 
encountered in a large majority of French listed companies. 
Recent studies demonstrate that family-firms are superior performers;  I hence add the 
FAMILY  variable  and  do  not  observe  any  significant  impact  of  this variable  (unreported 
regression). In regression (6), the difference between voting and cash-flow rights is interacted 
with the FAMILY dummy variable. Family ownership tends to offset the negative impact of a 
high ownership-control discrepancy. It is often assumed that families are prone to extract 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholder but my results do not validate this 
intuition. In unreported regressions, I re-run equation (1) on the sample of family-controlled 
companies (271 observations) and on the sample of non-family controlled companies (389 
obseravtions). The coefficient of the WEDGE variable is always negative but only significant 
(with a p-value of 0.012) in the second sample. In the last column of Table 3, I try to analyse 
more precisely this last finding: among family-controlled firms, I differentiate between the 
firms  that  are  run  by  a  professional  CEO  (F_PRO,  144  observations)  and  those  that  are 
managed by the founder or a descendant (F_FAM, 127 observations). As mentioned above, an 
important  private  benefit  that  is  enjoyed  by  controlling  families  is  the  ability  to  allot 
significant management positions to family members. The regression shows that the positive 
impact  of  family  ownership  is  only  attributable  to  family  firms  that  are  managed  by  a 
professional CEO, in other words firms in which the family seems to be reluctant to exploit 
her controlling situation. This result corroborates the study of Sraer and Thesmar (2007) who 
show that abnormal returns to long-run shareholders of acquirers are higher for family-firms 
that are managed by an outside CEO. 20 
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4.1.3  The role played by other blockholders 
It is often argued that other blockholders (beyond the biggest shareholder) are likely to 
play  a  monitoring  role.  Laeven  and  Levine  (2008)  show  that  firms  exhibiting  a  complex 
ownership structure (i.e. having at least two large shareholders, each of them holding at least 
10% of the voting rights) have a higher valuation than firms with a single shareholder. This 
effect is even more pronounced when the dispersion of the cash-flow rights between large 
shareholders is small. 
I  hence  try  to  analyze  the  effect  of  other  blockholders  in  table  4.  My  sample  of  660 
observations contains 184 deals announced by firms with at least two large shareholders and 
354 by firms with one (or more) shareholder holding at least 5% of the voting rights. In 
regression  (1) to (3),  I  introduce three variables aimed  at capturing the power of outside 
blockholders. These new specifications do not change the main result: bidder announcement 
returns are negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of the 
largest shareholder. These regressions show that other blockholders have a negative impact on 
the quality of acquisition decisions. In the first regression, the coefficient for S2 UVR is 
negative and not far from significance (with a p-value of 0.112). This result is at odds with 
that obtained by Ben-Amar and André (2006) who find evidence of a strong and significant 
impact of outside blockholders; it also contradicts previous studies which document a positive 
association  between  performance  and  the  size  of  other  blockholders.
10  One  possible 
explanation is that other blockholders do not exert adequate monitoring effort; this could be 
due to a free-rider problem among large shareholders (Winton, 1993). In this context, the 
presence  of  multiple  blockholders  is  detrimental  to  firm  value  and  performance  as  large 
blockholders reduce liquidity without offering any offsetting monitoring advantage (Bolton 
and Von Thadden, 1998). 
In order to shed more light on the negative impact of other large blockholders, I now 
envisage  another  explanation,  namely  collusion  between  large  shareholders.  Maury  and 
Pajuste (2005) argue that certain shareholders’ coalitions can actually reduce the marginal 
cost of stealing  and make the diversion of resources  easier thanks to extra knowledge in 
hiding expropriation. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) consider a coalition formation game 
                                                 
10 For instance, a recent study by Attig et al. (2008) shows that the cost of equity capital decreases as the stake of 
other large blockholders increases. 21 
 
where  the  members  of  the  winning  coalition  share  private  benefits  of  control  among 
themselves.  In  the  context  of  this  paper,  the  negative  impact  of  other  blockholders  on 
abnormal returns may be attributable to their propensity to collude with the largest owner in 
order to share the private benefits that are derived from the acquisition.  
Identifying the existence of such coalitions is not an easy task. However, my focus on 
France offers an interesting advantage: in French listed companies, some shareholders can be 
signatories  to  explicit  agreements  that  govern  their  relations.  Each  shareholder  agreement 
must be disclosed to the AMF in the five days following its signature as soon as it concerns at 
least 0.5% of the securities or voting rights. This legal rule allows for an accurate knowledge 
of agreement’s provisions, the identity of the contracting shareholders and their ownership 
stakes. Shareholder agreements appear to be an important phenomenon as they are observed 
in 21.1 % of my sample of acquiring companies. In a majority of the cases, the largest owner 
is a signatory to this agreement (in 18.2% of the observations). 
A shareholder pact can contain a large number of clauses regarding the transfer of shares, the 
management  of  the  company  or  the  allocation  of  board  of  director’s  seats.
11  A  very 
widespread clause is the concerted action which is defined as an “agreement concluded to 
acquire or sell voting rights or to exercise these voting rights so as to implement a common 
policy towards the company”. The most important feature of a concerted action is the fact that 
contracting  shareholders  express  a  common  will  and  vision  about  the  firm’s  strategic 
decisions, it clearly characterizes a cooperative behavior of the signatories.  This very strong 
commitment  is  observed  in  15.5%  of  the  sample,  that  is  to  say  that  nearly  75%  of  the 
shareholder pacts contain the concerted action clause. Some authors have analyzed the effects 
of shareholder agreements and the results are mixed: Chemla et al. (2007) show that they are 
efficient  coordination  mechanisms  while  Gianfrate  (2007)  views  them  as  entrenchment 
devices aimed at protecting controlling shareholders from hostile takeovers. 
In  regressions  (4)  to  (6)  of  table  4,  I  include  new  variables  related  to  shareholder 
agreements. I first compute a dummy variable (AGREEMENT) which takes a value of one 
whether some shareholders of the acquiring company are bound to the largest owner by an 
agreement. I compute the sum of the ultimate voting rights held by (1) large shareholders who 
are signatories to an agreement with the largest owner (S234 AGREEMENT) and by (2) large 
shareholders  outside  the  coalition  (S234  NoAGREEMENT).  By  definition,  S234  UVR  is 
equal to the sum of S234 AGREEMENT and S234 NoAGREEMENT. In the same spirit, I 
                                                 
11 For a detailed description of shareholder agreements in French listed companies, see Belot (2010). 22 
 
compute  the  variables  OTHERS  AGREEMENT  and  OTHERS  NoAGREEMENT. 
Interestingly, the previous result seems to be driven by large blockholders who are not bound 
to the largest one by a shareholder pact. In other words, these regressions suggest that the 
coalition hypothesis is not accurate for my sample of French companies. My results reject the 
hypothesis  of  expropriation  by  shareholder  coalitions,  however  I  do  not  find  evidence  of 
superior performance by acquirers having a shareholder agreement.  
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4.2  Likelihood of bidding 
 
4.2.1  Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned above, my sample of French listed firms contains 3,063 observations. There 
was  a  deal  announcement  in  the  following  year  for  497  observations  (i.e.  16.2%  of  the 
sample). I first try to analyze the differences between firms which announced an acquisition 
over the period 2000-2009 and firms which did not. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and 
classical tests of differences. The differences between the two subsamples are of expected 
sign: bidding firms are much bigger, receive a higher valuation and have a higher growth; 
furthermore  they  are  more  frequently  cross-listed  in  the  U.S.  and  classified  as  high  tech 
companies. The intensity of M&A in their economic sector is also higher than that observed 
for their counterparts. 
The  table  also  reveals  very  significant  differences  in  ownership  characteristics:  the 
ultimate  cash-flow  rights  of  the  largest  owner  are  smaller  for  bidding  firms  while  her 
entrenchment (as measured by the difference between voting and cash-flow rights) is lower. 
This tends to shows that controlling shareholder whose control rights strongly exceeds their 
cash-flow rights are reluctant to make acquisitions. In unreported statistics, I notice that only 
6.5% of non-bidding companies are widely-held firms while they are 19.3% in the sample of 
acquirers.  This  shows  that  manager-controlled  firms  (as  opposed  to  owner-controlled 
companies)  are  more  frequent  bidders.  The  table  also  reveals  that  family  firms  are  over-
represented in the sample of non bidding firms, which indicates that families are cautious 
toward corporate acquisitions.  
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4.2.2  Multivariate analysis 
Table 6 reports the findings from different econometric specifications that incorporate 
year and sector dummies (these dummies are based on the 1-digit SIC code). The Mc Fadden 
R² values are around 15%, which tends to show that the explanatory power of the Probit 
models is high. The regressions confirm previous findings regarding the impact of firm size, 
growth  and  U.S.  listing.  Highly  leveraged  companies  are  less  likely  to  make  acquisition, 
which can be interpreted as evidence of financial constraint. 
Regressions (1) and (2) reveal that ownership has an important influence on the likelihood 
of corporate acquisitions. The cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder have a negative 
impact. This result is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis: shareholders holding high 
stakes in the company are more likely to scrutinize manager actions and hence avoid value-
destroying acquisitions. The negative impact of the divergence of cash-flow rights and voting 
rights  is  more  ambiguous:  shareholders  with  sub-optimal  incentives  (i.e.  holding  excess 
control rights) could favor acquisitions that provide them with private benefits of control even 
if  these  acquisitions  do  not  enhance  firm  value.  This  hypothesis  is  not  validated  by  the 
empirical analysis. This result may be explained as follows. The controlling shareholder’s 
voting  power  may  be  threaten  by  stock-financed  corporate  acquisitions  which  induce 
significant changes in the ownership structure. Because they significantly reduce corporate 
cash-holdings and/or borrowing capacities, even cash-financed acquisitions may lead to future 
equity  offerings.  Shareholders  with  excess  control  rights  may  be  very  cautious  toward 
corporate acquisitions, being aware of the relinquishment to control (and hence to associated 
private benefits) that such acquisitions induce.   
In  regression  (3),  I  analyze  the  impact  of  other  blockholders.  The  coefficient  of  the 
OTHERS variable is negative but insignificant, which demonstrates that these blockholders 
do  not  play  an  active  role  in  avoiding  or  favoring  corporate  acquisitions.  In  unreported 
regressions, I include the control rights of the second largest owner (S2 UVR) and the control 
rights of other large shareholders (S234 UVR) and do not observe significant coefficients. 
An  unreported  regression  shows  that  the  coefficient  associated  on  FAMILY  is  not 
significant. In regression (4), I include two variables aimed at capturing the impact of family 
ownership: the results show that family firms whose CEO is not a family member are more 
prone  to  make  acquisition.  The  coefficient  of  the  F_FAM  variable  is  negative  (but 
insignificant): one possible explanation is that family CEOs are not successful in complex 
acquisitions and are reluctant to attempt such acquisitions.  24 
 
Regression  (5)  confirms  previous  findings:  the  relative  size  of  the  acquisitions  is 
negatively associated with largest shareholder’s cash flow rights and her excess control rights. 
In  the  last  column,  I  exclude  bidding  firms  which  are  classified  as  banks  or  insurance 
companies as it is often argued that these financial companies have accounting data that are 
difficult to compare with firms in other sectors. The main results concerning the influence of 
ownership characteristics are unaffected.  
My results are in line with the European study of Caprio et al. (2010). The authors also 
observe a negative association between the ownership/control discrepancy and the propensity 
to engage in acquisitions. The  empirical  analysis thus contradicts the pessimistic view of 
controlling shareholders favoring acquisitions thanks to their excess control rights. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ] 
 
5  Robustness checks 
 
5.1  Other specifications 
 
Table 7 presents different regressions aimed at testing the robustness of previous results. 
In regression (1), I exclude the deals that are not classified as completed in the SDC database. 
This makes the results more comparable with those obtained by Ben-Amar and André (2006). 
This does not change my results, the coefficient on WEDGE RATIO is still positive and 
significant. 
In the second regression, I exclude the firms that are classified as widely-held (i.e. which 
do not have a controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights). Although 
being less significant than in the standard regression, the coefficient of the WEDGE variable 
is still negative. 
As mentioned above, some firms are very frequent acquirers and the time period between 
two deals is sometimes inferior to 200 days (i.e. the length of the time period over which the 
market  model  parameters  of  the  event  study  are  estimated).  In  order  to  circumvent  the 
contamination  effect,  I  exclude  all  the  acquisitions  made  by  firms  which  have  already 
announced another deal during the estimation period. The third column of table 7 presents the 
results. I do not observe significant differences and the main result holds. 
In regression (4), I use cumulative abnormal returns computed on a larger event-window 
(CAR(-2,+2)). This does not lead to significant changes. In unreported regressions, I notice 25 
 
that my results holds when the 7-day CAR (CAR(-3,+3))  are used as the dependant variable. 
In regression (5), I run a Logit model with the dependant variable taking the value of one 
when CAR(-2,+2) are lower than 0.
12 In the spirit of Masulis et al. (2009), this specification 
allows to test whether acquisitions initiated by firms whose largest shareholder is entrenched 
generate negative  abnormal returns and destroy shareholder value. This regression clearly 
shows that it is the case.  
In unreported tests, I re-run the regressions of table 3 by adding the variables that are 
included in the Probit model to determine the likelihood of bidding (leverage, assets growth, 
proportion of tangible assets, U.S. listing, high tech dummy). The coefficients of the variables 
measuring the separation of ownership and control are stable and remain significant. The 
coefficients of the added variables are all insignificant except the one associated with the ratio 
of tangible assets over total assets (the coefficient is significantly negative). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ] 
 
5.2  Sample selection bias 
 
In the first part of the paper, I analyze the relationship between ownership structure and 
the short-term financial impact of corporate acquisitions. The sample is not randomly chosen 
in that it only consists of firms which choose to make at least one acquisition over the 2000-
2009 decade. The second part of the paper shows that these firms differ in many ways from 
firms which never experience acquisitions. To address a potential sample selection bias, I 
employ the Heckman’s (1979) two step procedure. In the first step, I estimate a Probit model 
whose dependant variable takes the value of one whether the firm announces a bid. I then 
compute the inverse Mills ratio for each observation of the sample.
13 In the second step, I run 
the previous OLS regressions (with CAR(-1,+1) as the dependant variable) and include the 
inverse Mills’ ratio as an additional explanatory variable. If this variable has an insignificant 
coefficient, one can conclude that sample selection bias is not a major issue and hence that 
there is no over or underestimation of the coefficients.  
I first construct the inverse Mills ratio (INV MILLS) based on the coefficient estimates 
from regression (2) of table 6 and include it as an additional explanatory variable in my 
                                                 
12 It is worth mentioning that nearly half of the deals generate negative abnormal returns: the dependant variable 
is equal to one in 49.1% of the sample. 
13 For a detailed description of selection problems, see Chapter 17 of Wooldridge (2002).  26 
 
analysis of bidders’ announcement abnormal returns. The results are presented in the sixth 
column of table 7. In the last column, I repeat this analysis for the subsample of non-financial 
firms with the inverse Mills ratio based on Probit estimates from table 6 (regression (6)).  
In  the  last  regression,  the  coefficient  of  the  inverse  Mills  ratio  is  not  significant  at 
conventional threshold. Consequently, selection bias does not appear as a serious concern for 
my estimates. Furthermore, the results hold when financial companies are excluded.  
The coefficient on INV MILLS is positive and marginally significant in the sixth column. 
This  suggests  that  it  is  important  to  control  for  sample  selection  bias.  I  observe  that  the 
coefficient on WEDGE RATIO is now significant at the 5% threshold; it also appears that the 
coefficient on LOG ASSETS is no longer significant. The interpretation of the results is the 
following:  the  empirical  analysis  demonstrates  that  firms  with  a  high  ownership/control 
discrepancy earn lower abnormal returns (Table 3) while being also less frequent bidders (see 
Table 6). In other words, such firms are under-represented in the acquisition sample and the 
negative impact of the difference between voting and cash-flow rights on CARs might be 
underestimated in standard OLS regressions. It also appears that the coefficient on the size 
variable is no longer significant, big firms being overrepresented in the acquisition sample 
and hence the coefficient on LOG ASSETS overestimated in OLS regressions linking size to 
abnormal returns. 
Even if the coefficient on inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is only marginally significant, sample 
selection  bias  appears  to  be  an  important  issue.  I  hence  include  IMR  in  all  previous 
regressions,  the  results  hold  and  the  magnitude  of  coefficients  on  WEDGE  or  WEDGE 
RATIO  is  larger  (results  are  available  upon  request).  This  studies  advocates  for  sample 
selection corrections as the coefficients estimates of earlier studies might be biased: Ben-
Amar and André (2006) do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative 
impact on performance, this could be due to sample selection problems as bidders are not 
randomly selected from the entire population of listed companies. 
 
5.3  Endogeneity 
 
5.3.1  Endogeneity, part 1 
So far, my results suggests that controlling owners use their excess control right to favor 
acquisitions  that  are  in  their  own  interests.  These  acquisitions  provide  them  with  private 
benefits of control that are not available to all shareholders. However, my results should be 27 
 
interpreted  cautiously  as  studies  dedicated  to  ownership  structures  may  be  susceptible  to 
endogeneity concerns.  
The relationship between ownership structure and performance has received considerable 
attention  in  financial  literature.  Many  studies  (see  Demsetz  and  Villalonga  [2001]  for  a 
detailed  survey)  estimate  an  equation  whose  dependant  variable  is  a  proxy  for  corporate 
performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA…) while regressors are control (size of the company, financial 
leverage…) and ownership (insider holdings, identity of the largest owner…) variables. Some 
authors  argue  that  ownership  characteristics  are  not  randomly  determined  and  there  are 
serious reasons to believe that ownership emerges as a response to firm’s characteristic and 
environment (Demsetz and  Lehn, 1985).  For instance, market  capitalization is a potential 
determinant of corporate performance but might also explain the presence and size of a large 
blockholder  (the  wealth  needed  to  hold  a  substantial  stake  in  General  Electric  makes  the 
presence of a large blockholder not likely). Furthermore, ownership characteristics are likely 
to be correlated with (omitted) factors that also affect performance: Demsetz and Lehn argue 
that  a  concentrated  ownership  structure  is  more  likely  to  emerge  when  there  is  amenity 
potential associated with the control of the company. Such private benefits might affect both 
corporate performance  and ownership characteristics: a large shareholder could indeed be 
willing  to  increase  her  voting  rights  while  decreasing  her  cash-flow  rights  when  the 
opportunities for private benefits extraction are greater. To sum up, endogeneity concerns 
make the interpretation of standard regressions difficult: ownership variables might indeed be 
correlated with the error terms and the coefficient estimates of single equation models of the 
effect of ownership structure on corporate performance might be severely biased. 
To mitigate such endogeneity problem, instrumental variables (IV) are commonly used in 
financial and accounting research. As emphasized by Angrist and Krueger (2001), a valid 
instrument  needs  to  fulfill  two  conditions:  “a  good  instrument  is  correlated  with  the 
endogenous regressor for reasons the researcher can verify and explain, but uncorrelated 
with the outcome variable for reasons beyond its effect on the endogenous regressor”. In this 
paper, the key variable of interest is the difference between voting and cash-flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder. I attempt to determine which variables meet the following criteria: 
(1) they have a significant influence on the WEDGE variable and (2) they do not affect the 
dependant variable (acquisitions’ quality proxied by the CARs) directly but only through their 
influence on the endogenous variable (WEDGE). 
The first variable I consider is the number of years since firm’s first listing on the stock 
market  (proxied  by  the  first  year  the  firm  appears  in  Datastream).  One  argument  is  the 28 
 
following: recently listed companies must attract (international) investors and have a higher 
interest in good corporate governance. They face a growing pressure for compliance with 
codes of best practices; the double-voting rights mechanism which contradicts the one share-
one vote rule is clearly not a good governance principle. In my acquisition sample, bidders 
with double voting rights have been listed for 17.3 years (vs. 12.2 years for others bidders, the 
difference being significant at the 1% threshold). Furthermore, firms that have been listed for 
a long period of time are more likely to exhibit pyramidal structure, this being due to the 
larger number of complex events (mergers for instance) involving ownership changes they 
have experienced. In the acquisition sample, bidders exhibiting a pyramidal structure have 
been listed for 17.3 years (versus 15.0 years for other firms, the difference being significant at 
the 5% threshold). The question whether this variable might directly affect firm performance 
arises. Moeller et al. (2004) notice that firm age has no significant impact on announcement 
abnormal returns.  I repeat this analysis by including the age variable and draw the same 
conclusion.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  such  an  “historical”  instrument  has  been  used  by 
Fahlenbrach  (2009)  in  a  study  dedicated  to  the  impact  of  founder-CEOs  on  corporate 
performance.  
The second variable I consider is aimed at capturing amenity potential of a firm’s output. 
In a study dedicated to dual-class companies in the U.S., Gompers et al. (2010) argue that the 
choice of the dual-class structure (and hence the choice of a high separation of ownership and 
control) is not random and driven by variables capturing various forms of private benefits. 
One of the measures is the ratio of firm’s sales to the sales of all firms in the same geographic 
region.  The  underlying  reasoning  is  the  following:  there  are  private  benefits  (especially 
prestige and social status) associated with the fact of being a big employer and a well-know 
citizen of a local community. Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) show that owner-managers 
are  more  likely  to  lock  control  when  the  firm  has  its  headquarters  outside  Paris,  Lyon, 
Marseille and Lille (the four biggest French cities). To compute my variable (PCT SALES), I 
use the following procedure: I first extract (from the Worldscope database) the postal codes 
and sales of all French firms that have been listed over the years 1999-2008.
14 I then classify 
them according to the first two digits of this postal code which identify the “département” 
where the firm has its headquarters.
15 In the acquisition sample, the average value of the PCT 
SALES  variable  is  equal  to  10.8%  for  firms  having  a  high  separation  of  ownership  and 
                                                 
14 I do not require these firms to be components of the SBF250 index. I hence consider 1,245 unique French 
firms that have been listed for at least one year over the period 1999-2008. 
15 There are 100 départements in France, this administrative zoning was drawn around 1800. 29 
 
control (HIGH WEDGE=1) whereas being equal to 8.1% for other firms (nevertheless, the 
difference is only significant at the 15% threshold). In my opinion, there is no reason to 
suspect  that  corporate  performance  is  related  to  the  localization  of  the  company’s 
headquarters. For instance, one could difficultly argue that firms located in area X record 
better performance than those located in area Y: France is a well developed economy and 
public  infrastructure  are  adequate  for  all  geographic  areas.  One  could  also  argue  that 
controlling shareholder with high power and social prestige in a given geographic area may 
get favors from local politicians, which could have an impact on firm performance. This is 
however  not  a  major  issue:  Faccio  (2006)  shows  that  only  2.19%  of  French  firms  are 
politically connected (the world average is equal to 2.68%); furthermore the performance of 
politically  connected  firms  tends  to  be  lower  (Faccio,  2010).  I  include  the  PCT  SALES 
variable in my regressions and do not observe any significant impact on firm’s performance 
as proxied by cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of an acquisition.  
I use the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology. In the first stage, I regress 
the endogenous right-hand side variable (WEDGE) on the set of chosen instruments. In the 
second stage, the predicted (instrumented) values of WEDGE are introduced in the baseline 
regressions. Table 8 presents the results of this empirical analysis. The first two columns 
report the results obtained on the whole acquisition sample, whereas regressions (3) and (4) 
are  estimated  with  the  deals  that  are  not  classified  as  completed  in  the  SDC  database. 
Regression (5) is estimated using the sample of firms having at least one large shareholder, 
with a second stage dependant variable taking the value of one when cumulative abnormal 
returns around the announcement date are negative.
16  
First, it appears that the selected instrument have a strong influence in explaining the 
separation of ownership and control. Old firms and firms having a large economic importance 
in  their  geographic  area  are  more  likely  to  exhibit  an  important  ownership/control 
discrepancy.  The  table  shows  that  the  new  specifications  do  not  significantly  change  the 
coefficient estimates of the control variables. It also appears that the coefficient on WEDGE is 
negative and significant in columns (2) to (4). It should be noted that the p-value associated to 
the  instrumented  regressor  in  regression  (1)  is  equal  to  12.8%.  Regression  (5)  confirms 
previous findings: the probability of a negative market reaction to the announcement of an 
acquisition is increasing in the wedge between  voting and  cash-flow rights of the largest 
shareholder. 
                                                 
16 As the dependant variable in the second stage is an indicator variable, I use the ivprobit command of STATA 
10 to estimate regression (5). 30 
 
Be that as it may, it should be mentioned that the identification of the right instrument is a 
difficult and risky task. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) discuss the quality of variables aimed 
at instrumenting ownership-control disproportionality. They conclude that they lack qualified 
instruments for an IV analysis. More generally, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) demonstrate that 
many instrumental variables applications in accounting and financial research are likely to 
produce highly misleading parameter estimates. Coles et al. (2007) illustrate the difficulties in 
choosing  appropriate  instrument  in  studies  dedicated  to  the  ownership-performance 
relationship. 
Conventional tests (Sargan statistic and J test) for overidentifying restrictions validate the 
null hypothesis of instruments uncorrelated with the error terms; moreover I examine the fit of 
the  first  stage  and  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  weak  instruments  in  all  the  reported 
regressions.
17 Although these tests tend to demonstrate the appropriateness of the instruments, 
the  results  should  be  interpreted  cautiously.  Wooldridge  (2002)  points  out  potential  large 
biases of 2SLS and recalls that “we must choose between a possibly inconsistent estimator 
that has relatively small standard errors (OLS) and a consistent estimator that is so imprecise 
that nothing interesting can be concluded” (p. 104). This could explain why the coefficient 
estimates are sometimes less significant than with OLS regressions. Be that as it may, the 
negative coefficient of the WEDGE variable in regressions (1) to (4) confirms the results that 
were obtained with standard OLS regressions. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE ] 
 
5.3.2  Endogeneity, part 2 
One form of the endogeneity problem is reverse causality. If we assume that controlling 
shareholders (1) use acquisitions as means of extracting private benefits and (2) anticipate 
future acquisitions, they could be likely to modify their ownership (and control) stakes ex-
ante. The reasoning is the following: anticipating future bad acquisitions (i.e. with negative 
CARs), they could be tempted to increase their control rights (they can hence use these voting 
rights in order to favor the achievement of the deal) and reduce their cash-flow rights (in order 
to minimize the decrease in their net wealth induced by the value-destroying acquisition). 
However, I do not find evidence of such an opportunistic behavior. Previous year ownership 
                                                 
17 See Baum (2006) for an accurate description of the tests that can be performed in order to check the validity of 
instruments. 31 
 
variables are available for 560 observations of my acquisition sample; the WEDGE variable is 
equal to 7.00% in year t and 7.03% in year t-1 (the difference is not significant, with a p-value 
of 0.90). To further address the reverse causality concern, I replace the annual values of S1 
UCF and WEDGE in year t with their values in the first year the firm appears in my sample 
(following Masulis et al. [2009] who use such a specification). This additional test does not 
change the results.  
6  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates  an important financial decision, namely corporate acquisitions, 
and  how  the  ownership  structure  of  the  firm  affects  (1)  abnormal  returns  around 
announcement  date  and  (2)  the  propensity  to  launch  a  takeover  bid.  The  results  clearly 
demonstrate  that  minority  shareholders  of  firms  whose  largest  shareholder  holds  excess 
control rights experience lower abnormal returns. This result is robust to sample selection bias 
that has not been taken into account in earlier studies. 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  ongoing  debate  on  the  one  share-one  vote  principle.  
Institutional investors request the suppression of double voting rights (see for instance the 
recommendations of the association which represents the French asset management industry - 
AFG, 2010). However, prominent CEOs advocate that this violation of the one share – one 
vote principle protects the firm against the influence of short term investors (see the recent 
viewpoint expressed by Claude Bébéar (2008), former CEO and chairman of AXA). Burkart 
and Lee (2008) question the relevance of French double voting rights. This paper clearly 
demonstrates that double voting rights comes at a cost as firms authorizing this mechanism 
experience lower abnormal returns around acquisition announcements. 
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Appendix A: The ownership structure of GROUPE CASINO 
This figure presents the ownership structure of GROUPE CASINO as of December 31, 2007. 
Firms in grey boxes are publicly traded firms. The control of GROUPE CASINO is realized 
through  an  extensive  use  of  double  voting  rights  (encountered  in  GROUPE  CASINO  / 
RALLYE / FONCIERE EURIS) and pyramiding. Non-voting shares account for 13.50% of 
GROUPE CASINO’s existing equities. 
Following La Porta et al. (1999), I consider that the Naouri family is the ultimate controlling 
owner of GROUPE CASINO (at the apex of the pyramid). In line with Faccio and Lang 
(2002), I consider that this ultimate owner holds ultimate cash-flow rights equal to 23.09% 
(=99.99%*92.15%*88.78%*57.28%*49.28%)  and  ultimate  voting  rights  equal  to  62.32% 
















Appendix B: Description of the variables 
 
AGREEMENT  Equals  1  if  a  shareholder  agreement  is  in  force  in  the  acquiring  firm,  0 
otherwise. Source: Author’s database. 
ASSETS 
GROWTH 
Bidder’s growth rate of total assets in the year preceding the announcement of 
the bid. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Worldscope. 
CASH  Equals 1 if the transaction is entirely paid with cash, 0 otherwise. Source: SDC. 
CROSS BORDER  Equals  1  if  the  target  company  is  not  incorporated  in  bidder’s  country  of 
incorporation, 0 otherwise. Source: SDC. 
DIVER  Equals 1 if acquiring and target firms do not have the same 2-digit SIC code, 0 
otherwise. Source: SDC. 
DVR  Equals 1 if double voting rights are authorized by the company’s charter, 0 
otherwise. Source: Author’s database. 
FAMILY  Equals 1 if the ultimate owner of the company is an individual or a family, 0 
otherwise. Source: Author’s database. 
F_PRO  Equals 1 if (1) the ultimate owner of the company is an individual or a family 
and (2) the CEO is not a member of this family (i.e. the CEO is a professional 
manager), 0 otherwise. Source: Author’s database. 
F_FAM  Equals 1 if (1) the ultimate owner of the company is an individual or a family 
and (2) the firm is managed by a member of this family, 0 otherwise. Source: 
Author’s database. 
HIGH TECH  Equals 1 when the primary SIC Code of the firm is 3571-2-5-7-8, 3661-3-9, 
3674,  3812,  3823-5-6-7-9,  4899  or  7370-1-2-3-4-5-9  (Faccio  and  Masulis, 
2005),  0  otherwise.  Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  data  from 
Worldscope. 
HIGH WEDGE  Equals 1 when the variable WEDGE RATIO is lower than its median value, i.e. 
when there is a strong divergence of voting and cash-flow rights; 0 otherwise. 
Source: Author’s database. 
INDUSTRY M&A  Computed as the value of all corporate control transactions reported by SDC for 
each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of all 
Worldscope firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year. Source: Author’s 
calculations based on data from Worldscope and SDC.  
LEVERAGE  Ratio of financial debts over total assets at the end of the fiscal preceding the 
announcement. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Worldscope. 
LISTING USA  Equals 1 when the firm has a listing on a major U.S. stock exchange (Nyse, 
Amex or Nasdaq), 0 otherwise. Source: Datastream. 
LOG(ASSETS)  Log (Bidder’s book value of assets expressed in million euros at the end of the 
fiscal  preceding  the  announcement).  Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on 
data from Worldscope. 
OTHERS  Sum of the ultimate voting rights of all shareholders (except the largest one) 
holding at least 5% of the voting rights. Set equal to 0 when (1) there is no large 
shareholder  holding  at  least  10%  of  the  voting  rights  (i.e.  for  widely  held 
companies) or (2) when there is no shareholder holding at least 5% of the voting 
rights beyond the largest shareholder. Source: Author’s database. 
OTHERS 
AGREEMENT 
Sum of the ultimate voting rights of all shareholders (holding at least 5% of the 
voting rights) who are signatories to an agreement involving the largest owner. 
Set equal to 0 whether the largest shareholder of the company is not signatory to 
a shareholder agreement. Source: Author’s database. 
OTHERS 
NoAGREEMENT 
= OTHERS – OTHERS AGREEMENT. Source: Author’s database. 
PPE/ASS  Ratio of property, plants and equipments over total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year preceding the announcement. Source: Author’s calculations based on data 
from Worldscope. 34 
 
PCT SALES  Ratio of firm’s sales to the sales of all firms in the same “département” (a 
French  geographic  area).  Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  data  from 
Worldscope. 
PUBLIC  Equals 1 if the target is a publicly traded company, 0 otherwise. Source: SDC. 
PYRAMID  Equals 1 when the firm is controlled through a pyramidal structure, 0 otherwise 
(source: Author’s database) 
REL. SIZE  Computed as the ratio [deal value/(deal value + bidder’s market capitalization at 
the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  preceding  the  announcement)].  Source:  Author’s 
calculations based on data from Datastream and SDC. 
S1 UCF  Ultimate cash-flow rights of the largest owner, computed at the 10% threshold. 
Set equal to 0 if there is no shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting 
rights. Source: Author’s database. 
S1 UCF^2  = (S1 UCF)². Source: Author’s database. 
S2 UVR  Ultimate  voting  rights  of  the  second  large  owner,  computed  at  the  10% 
threshold. Set equal to 0 if there is no second large shareholder holding at least 
10% of the voting rights. Source: Author’s database. 
S234 UVR  The sum of the ultimate voting rights of the second, third, and fourth largest 
shareholders (holding at least 10% of the voting rights). Set equal to 0 if there is 
0 or only one large shareholder. Source: Author’s database. 
S234 
AGREEMENT 
The sum of the ultimate voting rights of large blockholders (holding at least 
10%  of  the  voting  rights)  who  are  signatories  to  a  shareholder  agreement 
involving the largest owner. Set equal to 0 whether the largest shareholder of 




= S234 UVR – S234 AGREEMENT. Source: Author’s database. 
TOBIN’S Q  Computed as the ratio [(bidder’s total assets + bidder’s market capitalization – 
bidder’s book value of equity)/bidder’s total assets] at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the announcement. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
Worldscope. 
WEDGE  = Ultimate voting rights of the largest owner (computed at the 10% threshold) – 
S1UCF. Source: Author’s database. 
WEDGE RATIO  = S1UCF / Ultimate voting rights of the largest owner (computed at the 10% 
threshold). Source: Author’s database. 
YEARS IPO  Number  of  years  between  the  deal  and  the  first  year  the  firm  appears  in 
Datastream. Source: Datastream. 
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Table 1: Sample description 
The sample consists of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 2000 
-2009.  
Panel A presents the distribution of the deals across the years and the average (median) deal value reported in the 
SDC database. Some bidders make more than one acquisition in a given year; the number of bidders is thus 
lower than the number of acquisitions. 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of the bidders (accounting, financial and 
ownership variables) and the characteristics of the deal. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Number of deals, bidders and deal values  





value (€ M) 
Median deal 
value (€ M) 
2000  105  67  1535  135 
2001  72  49  739  183 
2002  59  45  362  82 
2003  45  38  215  49 
2004  62  44  1010  73 
2005  62  45  508  110 
2006  71  55  791  140 
2007  89  66  652  80 
2008  63  50  954  76 
2009  32  27  451  227 
Total  6  0  196  800  105 
 
 
Panel B: Deals’ descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Median  St. Dev. 
LOG(ASSETS)  3.67  3.76  1.10 
TOBIN'S Q  1.83  1.33  1.76 
DIVER  0.44  0.00  0.50 
CASH  0.81  1.00  0.39 
PUBLIC  0.22  0.00  0.42 
CROSS BORDER  0.67  1.00  0.47 
INDUSTRY M&A  0.06  0.03  0.07 
REL. SIZE  0.12  0.05  0.17 
S1 UCF  0.23  0.16  0.23 
WEDGE  0.08  0.05  0.11 
WEDGE RATIO  0.79  0.88  0.26 
HIGH WEDGE  0.50  0.50  0.50 
S2 UVR  0.05  0.00  0.08 
S234 UVR  0.06  0.00  0.10 
OTHERS  0.10  0.05  0.12 
FAMILY  0.41  0.00  0.49 
F_FAM  0.19  0.00  0.39 
F_PRO  0.22  0.00  0.41 
DVR  0.65  1.00  0.48 
PYRAMID  0.21  0.00  0.41 
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Table 2: Bidder abnormal announcement returns 
The sample consists of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 2000 
-2009.  
The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the 3-day period around the announcement date (CAR(–
1,+1)) with a market model whose parameters are estimated over the 200 days period from event day –210 to 
event day –11; I use the SBF250 index return as the market return. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix B. 
The table provides mean and median values. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Student t-statistics and Wilcoxon Z-statistics test for the difference in 
means (medians) between categories.  
 
        CAR(-1,+1) 
    n=  % sample  mean    median   
WHOLE SAMPLE    660  100%  0.69%  ***  0.28%  *** 
               
DIVER  0  370  56%  1.11%  ***  0.65%  *** 
  1  290  44%  0.15%    -0.02%   
   t/z - test        2.18  **  1.89  * 
CASH  0  124  19%  0.17%     -0.15%    
  1  536  81%  0.81%  ***  0.33%  *** 
   t/z - test        -1.13     -1.43    
PUBLIC  0  513  78%  1.05%  ***  0.38%  *** 
  1  147  22%  -0.55%    -0.01%   
   t/z - test        3.04  ***  1.99  ** 
CROSS-BORDER  0  216  33%  1.17%  ***  0.47%  *** 
  1  444  67%  0.46%  *  0.13%   
   t/z - test        1.51     1.49    
HIGH WEDGE  0  330  50%  1.01%  ***  0.44%  *** 
  1  330  50%  0.37%    0.15%   
   t/z - test        1.45     1.29    
DVR  0  228  35%  1.17%  ***  0.47%    
  1  432  65%  0.46%  *  0.13%  ** 
  t/z - test      1.21    0.04   
PYRAMID  0  519  79%  0.66%  ***  0.19%  ** 
  1  141  21%  0.82%  *  0.35%   
   t/z - test        1.21     0.04    
FAMILY  0  389  59%  0.53%  *  0.08%    
  1  271  41%  0.92%  ***  0.55%  *** 
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Table 3: Announcement abnormal returns and ownership characteristics 
The sample consists of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 2000 -2009. The dependant 
variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)). Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector (1-digit SIC 
code) dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and acquirer clustering. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) 
level, respectively.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
WEDGE  -0.038  **  -0.038  **              -0.114  **  -0.115  ** 
  (-2.03)    (-2.09)                (-2.55)    (-2.56)   
WEDGE RATIO          0.016  *                 
          (1.78)                   
HIGH WEDGE              -0.011  **             
              (-2.16)               
S1 UCF      0.005    0.000    0.009    0.005    0.007    0.008   
      (0.52)    (0.04)    (0.27)    (0.50)    (0.68)    (0.74)   
S1 UCF^2              -0.005               
              (-0.10)               
DVR                  -0.012  **         
                  (-2.24)           
PYRA                  -0.001           
                  (-0.12)           
FAMILY                      -0.004       
                      (-0.49)       
WEDGE*FAMILY                      0.091  *     
                      (1.91)       
F_FAM                          -0.003   
                          (-0.27)   
WEDGE*F_FAM                          0.070   
                          (1.11)   
F_PRO                          -0.004   
                          (-0.43)   
WEDGE*F_PRO                          0.101  ** 
                          (2.06)   
PUBLIC  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.017  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  *** 
  (-3.07)    (-3.08)    (-3.06)    (-3.03)    (-3.09)    (-3.06)    (-3.05)   
CROSS BORDER  -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.006    -0.005    -0.006    -0.006   
  (-1.09)    (-1.05)    (-1.10)    (-1.14)    (-1.07)    (-1.18)    (-1.22)   
REL. SIZE  0.022    0.022    0.023    0.021    0.022    0.022    0.022   
  (1.15)    (1.13)    (1.18)    (1.11)    (1.16)    (1.13)    (1.17)   
CASH  0.008    0.008    0.008    0.008    0.008    0.008    0.008   
  (1.30)    (1.23)    (1.26)    (1.16)    (1.25)    (1.15)    (1.18)   
DIVER  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  ** 
  (-2.50)    (-2.53)    (-2.58)    (-2.57)    (-2.56)    (-2.57)    (-2.51)   
INDUSTRY M&A  -0.047    -0.047    -0.050    -0.052    -0.048    -0.047    -0.047   
  (-1.31)    (-1.34)    (-1.37)    (-1.42)    (-1.36)    (-1.34)    (-1.35)   
LOG(ASSETS)  -0.008  **  -0.008  **  -0.007  **  -0.008  **  -0.007  **  -0.008  **  -0.008  ** 
  (-2.34)    (-2.16)    (-2.16)    (-2.28)    (-2.05)    (-2.19)    (-2.20)   
TOBIN'S Q  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  ** 
  (-2.07)    (-2.10)    (-2.08)    (-2.23)    (-2.01)    (-2.08)    (-2.12)   
CONSTANT  0.060  ***  0.059  ***  0.043  **  0.060  ***  0.060  ***  0.063  ***  0.062  *** 
  (2.94)    (2.80)    (2.15)    (3.03)    (2.83)    (2.86)    (2.89)   
                             
n =  660    660    660    660    660    660    660   
Nb clusters  196    196    196    196    196    196    196   
R²  0.094    0.094    0.094    0.098    0.098    0.097    0.098   
Adjusted R²  0.058    0.057    0.057    0.060    0.059    0.057    0.055   
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Table 4: Impact of other blockholders on announcement abnormal returns 
The sample consists of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 2000-2009. The 
dependant variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)). Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and 
sector (1-digit SIC code) dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and acquirer clustering. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
WEDGE  -0.042  **  -0.043  **  -0.044  **  -0.039  **  -0.043  **  -0.044  ** 
  (-2.31)    (-2.33)    (-2.40)    (-2.14)    (-2.33)    (-2.38)   
S1 UCF  0.006    0.006    0.006    0.006    0.005    0.005   
  (0.61)    (0.56)    (0.55)    (0.56)    (0.49)    (0.49)   
S2 UVR  -0.044                       
  (-1.60)                       
S234 UVR      -0.042  *                 
      (-1.90)                   
OTHERS          -0.045  **             
          (-2.27)               
AGREEMENT              -0.003    -0.001    -0.001   
              (-0.52)    (-0.06)    (-0.06)   
S234 AGREEMENT                  -0.025       
                  (-0.72)       
S234 NoAGREEMENT                  -0.069  *     
                  (-1.87)       
OTHERS AGREEMENT                      -0.021   
                      (-0.48)   
OTHERS NoAGREEMENT                      -0.065  ** 
                      (-2.41)   
PUBLIC  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  ***  -0.016  *** 
  (-2.92)    (-2.96)    (-2.98)    (-3.01)    (-2.98)    (-3.01)   
CROSS BORDER  -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.005    -0.005   
  (-1.08)    (-1.10)    (-1.05)    (-1.06)    (-1.02)    (-0.99)   
REL. SIZE  0.024    0.025    0.025    0.022    0.024    0.025   
  (1.28)    (1.29)    (1.33)    (1.17)    (1.27)    (1.29)   
CASH  0.009    0.009    0.009    0.008    0.008    0.008   
  (1.34)    (1.32)    (1.32)    (1.23)    (1.30)    (1.29)   
DIVER  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  **  -0.010  **  -0.011  **  -0.011  *** 
  (-2.56)    (-2.55)    (-2.59)    (-2.48)    (-2.56)    (-2.65)   
INDUSTRY M&A  -0.049    -0.049    -0.051    -0.048    -0.049    -0.052   
  (-1.38)    (-1.38)    (-1.43)    (-1.34)    (-1.39)    (-1.45)   
LOG(ASSETS)  -0.008  **  -0.009  **  -0.009  **  -0.008  **  -0.009  **  -0.010  *** 
  (-2.32)    (-2.41)    (-2.53)    (-2.17)    (-2.54)    (-2.67)   
TOBIN'S Q  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  **  -0.005  ** 
  (-2.01)    (-2.02)    (-2.06)    (-2.05)    (-2.08)    (-2.13)   
CONSTANT  0.063  ***  0.065  ***  0.069  ***  0.059  ***  0.068  ***  0.073  *** 
  (2.91)    (2.98)    (3.06)    (2.79)    (3.07)    (3.18)   
                         
n =  660    660    660    660    660    660   
Nb Clusters  196    196    196    196    196    196   
R²  0.098    0.099    0.102    0.095    0.101    0.104   
Adjusted R²  0.059    0.061    0.064    0.056    0.059    0.063   
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Table 5: Bidding vs. Non bidding firms 
Means, medians, standard deviations and tests of differences in means and medians between bidding and non bidding firms. Student t-statistics and Wilcoxon Z-statistics test 
for the differences in means and medians between the two categories. 
Bidding firms are defined as those announcing a corporate acquisition in the following year. Variable definitions are in Appendix B, except ASSETS which refers to the book 
value of assets in euro millions and MARKET CAP (market value of equity in € millions). 
The sample comprises 3,063firm-year observations from 401 SBF 250 firms listed in France over the period 1999 through 2008. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 








Test for differences  
([A]-[B]) in 
  n=3,063  n=2,566  n=497  Means  Medians 
  Mean  Median  St. Dev  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-test    z-test   
ASSETS GROWTH  0.21  0.07  0.66  0.18  0.07  0.36  0.10  -5.42  ***  -4.36  *** 
ASSETS   17636  605  104482  10735  517  53266  3270  -8.40  ***  -12.76  *** 
MARKET CAP   3874  426  11752  2699  341  9941  2394  -12.91  ***  -15.48  *** 
LOG(ASSETS)  2.95  2.78  0.93  2.85  2.71  3.49  3.51  -14.47  ***  -12.76  *** 
LEVERAGE  0.24  0.23  0.17  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.46    -0.17   
PPE/ASS  0.21  0.14  0.21  0.20  0.14  0.23  0.13  -2.18  **  -0.36   
TOBIN'S Q  1.70  1.30  1.50  1.68  1.28  1.80  1.35  -1.55    -3.54  *** 
LISTING USA  0.07  0.00  0.25  0.05  0.00  0.17  0.00  -9.87  ***  -9.72  *** 
HIGH TECH  0.15  0.00  0.36  0.15  0.00  0.19  0.00  -2.12  **  -2.12  ** 
INDUSTRY M&A  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.03  0.06  0.03  -2.60  ***  -2.06  ** 
S1 UCF  0.36  0.33  0.25  0.38  0.35  0.25  0.20  10.37  ***  10.54  *** 
WEDGE  0.10  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.05  3.88  ***  5.59  *** 
WEDGE RATIO  0.78  0.83  0.23  0.78  0.83  0.79  0.88  -0.50    -2.39  ** 
HIGH WEDGE  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.51  1.00  0.46  0.00  2.10  **  2.10  ** 
S2 UVR  0.06  0.00  0.10  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.00  1.79  *  1.48   
S234 UVR  0.08  0.00  0.12  0.08  0.00  0.07  0.00  1.84  *  1.42   
OTHERS  0.12  0.06  0.14  0.12  0.07  0.11  0.06  1.71  *  1.49   
FAMILY  0.62  1.00  0.49  0.65  1.00  0.46  0.00  8.18  ***  8.09  *** 
DVR  0.69  1.00  0.46  0.69  1.00  0.65  1.00  2.18  **  2.18  ** 
PYRAMID  0.26  0.00  0.44  0.26  0.00  0.22  0.00  2.03  **  2.03  ** 
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Table 6: Determinants of the bidding likelihood 
The sample comprises 3,063 firm-year observations from 401 SBF 250 firms listed in France over the period 1999 to 2008. 
Regressions  (1),  (2), (3), (4),  and  (6)  are Probit  regressions  whose  dependant  variable  is  equal  to  one  whether  the  firm 
announces an acquisition in the following year. In column (5) are the results of a Tobit regression in which the dependant 
variable is equal to the ratio (total value of the deals announced in year t+1/market capitalization at the end of year t). In 
regression (6), firms classified as belonging to the banking or insurance sectors are excluded. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector (1-digit SIC code) dummies are included in the regressions but are not 
reported.  
In parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (Huber/White). In regression (5), the t-
statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Specification  PROBIT  PROBIT  PROBIT  PROBIT  TOBIT  PROBIT 
























Sample  Whole  Whole  Whole  Whole  Whole  Non Financial 
WEDGE  -0.623  **      -0.649  **          -0.671  ** 
  (-2.31)        (-2.40)            (-2.44)   
WEDGE RATIO      0.319  **      0.374  ***  0.217  **     
      (2.50)        (2.69)    (2.11)       
S1 UCF  -0.720  ***  -0.821  ***  -0.733  ***  -0.793  ***  -0.666  ***  -0.693  *** 
  (-5.57)    (-5.90)    (-5.62)    (-5.30)    (-5.90)    (-5.17)   
OTHERS          -0.153               
          (-0.67)               
F_FAM              -0.065           
              (-0.80)           
F_PRO              0.152  *         
              (1.80)           
LOG(ASSETS)  0.479  ***  0.481  ***  0.475  ***  0.474  ***  0.282  ***  0.514  *** 
  (12.46)    (12.50)    (12.29)    (12.17)    (9.97)    (11.46)   
LEVERAGE  -0.757  ***  -0.767  ***  -0.762  ***  -0.753  ***  -0.389  **  -0.753  *** 
  (-3.60)    (-3.65)    (-3.62)    (-3.58)    (-2.15)    (-3.47)   
TOBIN'S Q  0.028    0.027    0.027    0.026    0.023    0.030   
  (1.42)    (1.41)    (1.38)    (1.31)    (0.90)    (1.55)   
PPE/ASSETS  0.631  ***  0.630  ***  0.636  ***  0.617  ***  0.464  ***  0.499  *** 
  (4.15)    (4.13)    (4.17)    (4.02)    (3.50)    (3.18)   
ASSETS GROWTH  0.162  ***  0.162  ***  0.164  ***  0.165  ***  0.100  ***  0.162  *** 
  (3.75)    (3.76)    (3.81)    (3.85)    (3.42)    (3.71)   
INDUSTRY M&A  -0.334    -0.334    -0.341    -0.357    -0.393    -0.451   
  (-0.70)    (-0.70)    (-0.72)    (-0.74)    (-1.05)    (-0.93)   
LISTING USA  0.230  **  0.220  **  0.221  **  0.216  *  0.094    0.215  * 
  (2.09)    (2.00)    (1.98)    (1.96)    (1.27)    (1.84)   
HIGH TECH  0.245  **  0.248  **  0.249  **  0.253  **  0.160  *  0.249  ** 
  (2.38)    (2.41)    (2.41)    (2.45)    (1.91)    (2.40)   
CONSTANT  -2.050  ***  -3.138  ***  -2.013  ***  -3.172  ***  -2.360  ***  -2.113  *** 
  (-8.35)    (-11.84)    (-8.05)    (-11.32)    (-11.90)    (-8.21)   
                         
n =  3063    3063    3063    3063    3063    2947   
Mc Fadden’s R²  0.152    0.152    0.152    0.155        0.146   
% Correct  0.844    0.846    0.845    0.848        0.847   
Pseudo R²                  0.083       
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Table 7: Robustness checks 
In regressions (4), (5), and (6) I use the sample of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 
2000-2009. In regression (1), the focus is on completed deals (the deals that are announced but not completed are excluded). In 
regression (2), firms which do not have at least one controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights are excluded. In 
regression (3), I exclude all the deals made by companies which announced another deal in the 210 preceding days. In regression (7), 
bidders classified as belonging to the financial sector (banks and insurance companies) are excluded. 
In regression (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7), the dependant variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)) while I use 
CAR(-2,+2) in regression (4). All regressions are OLS regressions except regression (5) which is a LOGIT specification. In this 
LOGIT model, the dependant variable takes the value of one whether the cumulative abnormal return computed over a 5-day period 
(CAR(-2,+2)) is negative. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector (1-digit SIC code) dummies are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
In regression (6) and (7), the inverse Mills’ ratio (INV MILLS) computed with Probit estimates of Table 6 (from regressions (2) and 
(6) respectively) are included. 
In  parentheses  are  t-statistics  based  on  standard  errors  adjusted  for  heteroskedasticity  (White,  1980)  and  acquirer clustering.  In 
regression (5), the z-stats are in parentheses and are based on Huber/White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Specification  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  LOGIT  OLS  OLS 
Dep. Variable 
CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-2,+2) 
=1 if 
CAR(-2,+2) 






No close deal 
announcement  Whole  Whole  Whole 
Non 
Financial 
WEDGE RATIO  0.017  *      0.023  **          0.021  **     
  (1.89)        (2.14)            (2.15)       
WEDGE      -0.037  *      -0.041  *          -0.047  ** 
      (-1.76)        (-1.81)            (-2.18)   
HIGH WEDGE                  0.326  *         
                  (1.92)           
S1 UCF  -0.002    0.010    0.009    0.012    -0.691  *  -0.014    0.000   
  (-0.20)    (0.70)    (0.75)    (0.91)    (-1.84)    (-0.94)    (-0.01)   
PUBLIC  -0.009    -0.016  ***  -0.016  **  -0.016  **  0.416  *  -0.016  ***  -0.015  *** 
  (-1.61)    (-2.73)    (-2.43)    (-2.24)    (1.85)    (-3.01)    (-2.75)   
CROSS BORDER  -0.007    -0.005    -0.007    -0.006    0.184    -0.005    -0.004   
  (-1.30)    (-0.93)    (-1.11)    (-0.95)    (0.97)    (-0.96)    (-0.71)   
REL. SIZE  0.017    0.020    0.022    0.036    -0.640    0.018    0.016   
  (0.79)    (1.03)    (0.95)    (1.59)    (-1.11)    (0.94)    (0.82)   
CASH  0.011    0.010    0.008    0.004    -0.155    0.007    0.008   
  (1.51)    (1.29)    (0.86)    (0.48)    (-0.68)    (1.06)    (1.13)   
DIVER  -0.012  **  -0.014  ***  -0.018  ***  -0.015  ***  0.145    -0.011  **  -0.011  ** 
  (-2.56)    (-2.83)    (-3.21)    (-3.15)    (0.93)    (-2.57)    (-2.28)   
INDUSTRY M&A  -0.068  *  -0.061    -0.083  *  -0.012    -0.759    -0.048    -0.042   
  (-1.69)    (-1.39)    (-1.76)    (-0.27)    (-0.62)    (-1.33)    (-1.18)   
LOG(ASSETS)  -0.009  **  -0.009  **  -0.007  *  -0.007    0.082    -0.002    -0.004   
  (-2.45)    (-2.21)    (-1.78)    (-1.61)    (0.79)    (-0.45)    (-0.82)   
TOBIN'S Q  -0.003    -0.005  *  -0.005  *  -0.008  ***  0.158  **  -0.004  *  -0.004  * 
  (-1.14)    (-1.71)    (-1.69)    (-2.73)    (2.43)    (-1.67)    (-1.76)   
INV MILLS                      0.019  *  0.015   
                      (1.69)    (1.37)   
CONSTANT  0.049  **  0.067  ***  0.047  **  0.058  *  -0.929    0.001    0.032   
  (2.28)    (2.64)    (2.28)    (1.91)    (-1.24)    (0.05)    (1.13)   
                             
n =  555    508    410    660    660    660    595   
Nb Clusters  181    177    195    196    196    196    184   
R²  0.091    0.123    0.133    0.122        0.097    0.101   
Adjusted R²  0.047    0.075    0.074    0.086        0.059    0.058   
Pseudo R²                  0.046           
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Table 8: Endogeneity issues 
The sample consists of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period 2000-2009. 
This table presents two-stage least squares regressions. In regression (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to the 555 
acquisitions that are classified as “completed” in the SDC database. In regression (5), firms which do not have at least one 
controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights are excluded. The variable treated as endogenous is 
WEDGE (the difference between voting and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder), the instruments are YEARS IPO 
(number of years since first appearance of the company in Datastream) and PCT SALES (ratio of firm’s sales to the sales 
of all firms in the same geographical area). For the first stage, I only report the coefficient estimates for the excluded 
instruments. In regression (1) and (3), the dependant variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)) while 
regressions (2) and (4) are estimated  with CAR(-2,+2) as dependant variable. In regression (5), the dependant variable is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one when CAR(-2,+2) is negative. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector dummies (based on the 1-digit SIC code) are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 







                     
First stage                     
YEARS IPO  0.019  ***  0.019  ***  0.017  ***  0.017  ***  0.028  *** 
  (3.64)    (3.58)    (2.92)    (2.92)    (4.94)   
PCT SALES  0.061  **  0.061  **  0.080  ***  0.080  ***  0.069  ** 
  (2.31)    (2.31)    (2.61)    (2.61)    (2.49)   
                     
R²  0.182    0.182    0.207    0.207    0.224   
Adjusted R²  0.148    0.148    0.168    0.168    0.182   
                     
Second Stage                     
Dep. Var :  CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-2,+2)  CAR(-1,+1)  CAR(-2,+2) 
=1 if 
CAR(-2,+2) <0 
WEDGE (instrumented)  -0.140    -0.188  *  -0.167  *  -0.204  *  3.434  ** 
  (-1.52)    (-1.66)    (-1.81)    (-1.74)    (2.00)   
PUBLIC  -0.016  ***  -0.016  **  -0.009    -0.009    0.221   
  (-3.03)    (-2.31)    (-1.63)    (-1.24)    (1.57)   
CROSS BORDER  -0.005    -0.006    -0.008    -0.011    0.129   
  (-1.05)    (-1.01)    (-1.33)    (-1.57)    (1.00)   
REL. SIZE  0.020    0.034    0.016    0.035    -0.207   
  (1.03)    (1.46)    (0.74)    (1.37)    (-0.54)   
CASH  0.010    0.006    0.012    0.005    -0.117   
  (1.26)    (0.71)    (1.39)    (0.54)    (-0.70)   
DIVER  -0.010  **  -0.014  **  -0.010  **  -0.013  **  0.027   
  (-2.23)    (-2.56)    (-2.20)    (-2.30)    (0.21)   
INDUSTRY M&A  -0.053    -0.020    -0.076  **  -0.039    -0.354   
  (-1.58)    (-0.49)    (-2.03)    (-0.86)    (-0.42)   
LOG(ASSETS)  -0.011  **  -0.012  **  -0.013  ***  -0.012  **  0.082   
  (-2.37)    (-2.16)    (-2.69)    (-2.08)    (1.06)   
TOBIN'S Q  -0.005  **  -0.009  ***  -0.003    -0.007  **  0.117  *** 
  (-2.48)    (-3.08)    (-1.46)    (-2.19)    (2.83)   
CONSTANT  0.087  **  0.100  **  0.102  ***  0.097  **  -1.566  ** 
  (2.59)    (2.35)    (2.80)    (2.13)    (-2.27)   
                     
n =  660    660    555    555    508   
R²  0.062    0.073    0.040    0.034       
Wald χ²                  52.90   
 